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Abstract: I agree with Nachev and Hacker’s general approach. However, their criticism of 
claims of covert automaticity can be strengthened. I first say a few words on what voluntary 
action involves and on the consequent limited relevance of brain research for the 
determination of voluntariness. I then turn to Nachev and Hacker’s discussion of possible 
covert automaticity and show why the case for it is weaker than they allow. 
 
The criteria for whether an action is voluntary are whether we can do it or abstain from doing it on 
request, whether we can wait with it or do it earlier if given a reason, whether when required we 
can do it faster, more slowly, or modify it in other ways. Also, when we act voluntarily, we are not 
surprised by our action, and we know what we are doing. 
The judgment of voluntariness is accordingly independent, as a rule (exceptions noted below), of 
any knowledge about brain or nervous system events. If the criteria mentioned above apply, then 
no knowledge about the brain can establish that an action we took to be voluntary isn’t such. 
Given our physiology, any movement that involves the activation of a muscle involves neural 
activity and usually brain activity as well. And possibly, there are systematic distinctions between 
patterns of brain activity during voluntary action and those during involuntary action. (I say only 
possibly, because I don’t know of any theoretical or empirical reason that shows a system to be 
necessary.) If so, then once correlations between voluntary action and patterns of brain activity are 
established, the latter can be used as an indirect indication of voluntariness. 
But such correlations need not exist. A person might hit the table with his fist for a variety of 
reasons and in a variety of ways, and presumably these actions are caused by different patterns of 
brain activity. Still, the hitting is voluntary because had he been warned not to do it, he wouldn’t 
have hit the table. The hitting is voluntary because of things that could have occurred but didn’t, 
and these unrealized possibilities needn’t be noticeable in the occurring brain events. So possibly 
nothing in the brain is correlated with voluntary action. 
The relevance of brain activity to the voluntariness of an action of which it is a partial cause is 
therefore at best of a limited nature: It can at most be indirect, inductive evidence for voluntariness. 
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Nachev and Hacker’s discussion of these issues is insufficient. They write, 
Where an antecedent or coincident somatic event of some kind is highly correlated with 
an action, the possibility arises that the movement is directly caused by a component 
marked by the event, whatever the subject might say. In such circumstances a movement 
that may appear to be voluntary […] may in fact be covertly automatic. 
They continue to discuss the likelihood of such correlations. 
However, even if such correlations exist, this goes no way towards establishing involuntariness. A 
voluntary movement of our arm is probably correlated with activity in the motor neurons 
innervating the relevant muscles. Yet the agent who raises his arm would not have raised it if we 
had given him a reason not to do so, or he would have done it differently had he thought it 
preferable, etc. So his action is voluntary, irrespective of the existence of this correlation. And such 
a correlation with neural events in the brain would not affect the voluntariness of the action, if this 
responsiveness to reasons exists. Accordingly, correlations of the kind Nachev and Hacker mention 
do not raise the possibility that a movement is only apparently voluntary. 
Nachev and Hacker don’t explain what they mean by automaticity. As this term has two relevant 
meanings, I shall consider both. Automaticity can mean the ability of a cell to depolarize itself, reach 
threshold potential and produce a propagated action potential, as in the pacemaker cells of the 
heart. To rule out the automaticity of an action in this sense we should ask the agent to do it, abstain 
from doing it, modify it in various ways, and so on. No one can do that with one’s heartbeat (unless 
by doing something else which is voluntary, e.g., doing exercise). However, this does apply to raising 
one’s arm, so this action is not automatic in this sense. Accordingly, the discovery of correlations 
between an action and an antecedent brain event wouldn’t raise the possibility of such covert 
automaticity, as long as we have the mentioned responsiveness to reasons. 
Automaticity is also used to characterize actions done inattentively. Actions done as a result of 
learning and repetition, like walking and assembly-line work, can be automatic in this sense, as well 
as changing one’s posture while sitting. But an action automatic in this sense can be voluntary: An 
assembly-line worker works for a reason, he can stop his work if requested, or modify his action if 
required, for instance, fasten the bolts tighter. A person can be asked not to move so much in her 
chair or not to sit like this or that: Only when she cannot but change her posture, say because of 
the pressure, is the change of posture involuntary (but then it is usually not automatic). 
The fact that Nachev and Hacker are unclear on the relation between somatic correlates of action 
and voluntariness makes them worry that backwards causation from the voluntary action to a 
correlated neural event occurring (say) 100 ms before it might be involved, “for how else could [the 
neural event] be a consequence and not a cause of [the voluntary action]?” To answer this worry, 
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they argue that the onset of the action cannot be dated precisely enough to postdate the neural 
event. But this is probably wrong and, moreover, unnecessary. The correlated event is a cause of 
the later movement, and the movement is yet voluntary. It is voluntary because had we convinced 
the agent before he acted and before the neural event occurred that he better not do what he in fact 
did, he wouldn’t have done it. Neither the action nor the correlated event would then have occurred. 
So neural causation and voluntariness can coexist. 
Nachev and Hacker’s discussion of alleged automaticity contains other aspects, with some of which 
I agree, but I don’t have space for more detail here. 
